Papers

If you have trouble accessing published versions, please feel free to email me.

“Philosophies of Recognition: An Introduction” co-authored with Thomas Khurana, Recognition: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Matthew Congdon and Thomas Khurana, Routledge (2025)

“Changing Our Nature: Ethical Naturalism, Objectivity, and History,” Philosophy (2023)

“Does Moral Philosophy ‘Leave Everything as It Is?” Analysis (2022)

“The Aesthetics of Moral Address,” Philosophical Topics (2021)

“Social Visibility: Theory and Practice,” co-authored with Alice Crary, Philosophical Topics (2021)

“Trusting Oneself Through Others: El Kassar on Intellectual Self-Trust,” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2021)

“The Struggle for Recognition of What?” European Journal of Philosophy (2020)

“Creative Resentments: The Role of Emotions in Moral Change,” The Philosophical Quarterly (2018)

“‘Knower’ as an Ethical Concept: From Epistemic Agency to Mutual Recognition,” Feminist Philosophy Quarterly (2018)

“What’s Wrong with Epistemic Injustice?” Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr, Routledge (2017)

“Wronged Beyond Words: On the Publicity and Repression of Moral Injury,” Philosophy & Social Criticism (2016)

“Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons,” Episteme 12:1 (March 2015)

Papers in Progress

Drafts are available upon request. Comments welcome.

“Two Myths about Emotion”

Abstract: An old myth once held that emotion and reason are fundamentally opposed. In this paper, I argue that a common philosophical strategy for overcoming this myth—defending an analogy between emotional rationality and propositional rationality—constitutes many philosophers’ “new myth” about emotion. I defend the alternative that emotions help frame agents’ outlooks in ways that precede and underlie the possibility of forming propositional attitudes in the first place.

“Emotions and Ideology”

Abstract: This paper argues for a non-propositional yet cognitive view of emotions, which can help explain the role emotions play in sustaining ideology. In making the argument, the paper explores two case studies: a character study from Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, The Remains of the Day, and recent efforts by social critics to deploy updated notions of ressentiment to criticize politically regressive social movements.

“The Demand for Recognition as an Aesthetic Act”

Abstract: This paper critically engages Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition by urging that certain demands for recognition aim not merely at eliciting the recognition of previously overlooked evaluative qualities, but at provoking perspectival shifts analogous to those sometimes prompted by powerful works of art.

“Art and the Disclosure of Social Reality: Murdoch, Adorno, and Kafka”

Co-authored with Karen Ng

Abstract: Although not often considered as interlocutors, Iris Murdoch and Theodor Adorno are unique in providing defenses of the idea that art has a distinctive power to disclose reality, where this idea is central to their respective philosophical projects. In addition to praising Adorno in her published writings and letters, Murdoch’s scattered remarks expressing appreciation for Kafka’s fiction often appear alongside comments on Adorno and their shared affection for Kafka over other authors. In this paper, we argue that Adorno’s “primacy of the object” thesis can helpfully shed light on Murdoch’s idea of loving attention. We do this by turning to Kafka’s fiction as their common object of aesthetic judgment, in order to illuminate their shared conviction that literary works have a special role to play in disclosing aspects of social reality, contingency, and human suffering. We will proceed in three parts: First, we situate Murdoch’s discussion of Adorno within the context of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals as a whole, focusing in particular on the relation between the primacy of the object thesis and Murdochian attention. Second, we turn to Kafka’s literary works to explore the themes of human suffering and social criticism. Here, we also discuss the uniqueness of Murdoch’s appreciation for Kafka’s absurdist, surrealist literature in contrast to her usual preference for the realist novel (authors such as Eliot, James, and Tolstoy). Third, we consider how Murdoch and Adorno’s mutual appreciation for Kafka can help us understand the role of “good art” and its potential power to disclose social reality. Although Murdoch is not a social theorist and wary of certain forms of social criticism, her admiration for Adorno and Kafka can help to articulate the relation between art, attention, and social critique, and especially how individual human suffering can disclose the realities of a social context.